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Abstract
This paper examines the factors that contribute to credit spreads in the primary market for
Japanese corporate bonds, especially when the Bank of Japan implemented unconventional
monetary policy measures. The models of credit spreads based on the Treasury convenience
yield hypothesis are estimated using an issue-level dataset. The results indicate that the factors
to explain credit spreads changed under the unconventional monetary policy regime. Investors
became less sensitive to the risk of default for issuers with different credit quality due to the
unprecedented degree of monetary easing. The Japanese government’s debt-to-GDP ratio,
which is a measure of the convenience yield on government bonds, is an important driver of
credit spreads throughout the sample period.
JEL classification numbers: E50, G12, G30
Keywords: Convenience yield, Corporate bonds, Credit spreads, Japanese government bonds,
Unconventional monetary policy.
1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, the Japanese corporate bond market experienced many changes
and events. Among them, the major and most unexpected event was the Fukushima Daiichi nu-
clear disaster at Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO)’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
on March 11, 2011. It had a severe impact in Japan and rendered TEPCO, Japan’s largest corpo-
rate bond issuer, unable to raise funds from the public bond market.1 The amount of outstanding
TEPCO corporate bonds was about 5 trillion yen ($ 60.9 billion) when the Great East Japan Earth-
quake hit Japan (The Nikkei, April 21, 2011). It is striking that the largest issuer suddenly dropped
out of the primary corporate bond market in Japan. In addition, the other electric power compa-
nies, the principal issuers in Japanese corporate bond market, were downgraded due to the high
uncertainty over their future costs. The Great East Japan Earthquake affected the corporate bond
market in Japan not only through principal issuers dropping out, but also through (unconventional)
monetary policy. In the wake of this disaster, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) had a significant task: to
revive the damaged economy. The BOJ rushed to bolster markets and implemented many uncon-
ventional monetary policy measures after March 2011. The Japanese corporate bond market then
experienced an unprecedented degree of monetary easing, which resulted in yields at record lows.
This study investigates the factors that contribute to the credit spread, which is the difference in
yields between defaultable debt instruments and risk-free government securities of comparable ma-
turity, in the Japanese corporate bond market. This study focuses on the period after the Great East
Japan Earthquake, when the BOJ implemented unconventional monetary policy measures. There
is a large body of literature explaining corporate bond spreads. For example, Puri (1996), Gande
et al. (1997), Gande et al. (1999), and Puri (1999) describe the factors that determine the spreads
for corporate bonds in the primary market. Moreover, papers such as Longstaff et al. (2005), Wu
and Zhang (2008), Gilchrist and Zakrajsˇek (2012), and Faust et al. (2013) provide evidence that
the underlying economic factors and individual default risk are important determinants of credit
spreads in the secondary market. To account for the shock of the nuclear disaster on electric power
companies, this study focuses on credit spreads for corporate bonds in the primary market.
In theory, credit spreads after the Great East Japan Earthquake should be higher due to the
increasing uncertainty about future economic fundamentals and damage to domestic production.
1After the Fukushima nuclear disaster, it took about 6 and a half years for TEPCO to resume public corporate bond
issuance on March 3, 2017, through its subsidiary TEPCO Power Grid Inc.
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In fact, Kumano et al. (2014) observe negative spillover effects due to disruptions of supply chain
networks and the declines in domestic production in some sectors in the period following the Great
East Japan earthquake. However, this study finds that the credit spreads after this earthquake are
lower on average when the credit spread model was estimated using data on individual corporate
bonds issued in these 20 years.
Behind this puzzling response, the Great East Japan earthquake and unconventional mone-
tary policy on the credit spreads had two opposing effects. First, the disruption in supply chain
networks and decline in domestic production increased credit spreads, and not only in the corre-
sponding sector. The increasing uncertainty about future economic fundamentals had a negative
impact on credit risk. This effect could increase the credit spreads. On the other hand, soon after
this earthquake, the BOJ expanded its asset buying scheme and maintained a massive stimulus pro-
gram to support the damaged economy. This monetary stimulus lowered not only the interest for
Japanese government bonds (JGB), but also the credit spreads. During the sample period after this
earthquake, the BOJ employed many unconventional monetary policy measures, which were influ-
ential and had affected the corporate bond market (see Kuroda (2016) for a detailed description of
the policy measures).
Using an issue-level dataset, this study undertakes a detailed analysis to explain the credit
spread in the Japanese corporate bond market. In explaining the credit spread, Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) provide interesting theoretical implications and show empirical evidence
that an increase in the Treasury supply lowers credit spreads using U.S. annual data, referring to
the value that investors assign to the liquidity and safety attributes of Treasuries as the Treasury
convenience yield. However, prior studies largely ignore this Treasury convenience yield as a
factor of credit spreads in firm- or issue-level analyses. In this study, the issue-level dataset al-
lows us to integrate the convenience yield on government bonds, which is an aggregate factor with
issue-level characteristics, by controlling for the financial health of the issuer, issue characteristics,
and bookrunner characteristics, which explain the remaining variations in credit spreads that ag-
gregate data cannot potentially explain. Following Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012),
we assume that three factors determine credit spreads: expected default on the corporate bond,
a risk premium associated with the covariance between default and the pricing kernel, and the
convenience yield on government bonds. Although prior studies document a relationship between
Treasury supply and interest rate spreads; for example, swap spreads in Cortes (2003) and spread
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between Refcorp bonds and Treasury bonds in Longstaff (2004). However, this study is the first
to document the significant and important relationship wherein the increase in the stock of govern-
ment bonds lowers credit spreads in an issue-level analysis. In addition, the results suggest that the
BOJ’s unconventional monetary policy significantly lowered credit spreads for all rating classes,
and investors became less sensitive to individual issuers’ credit risk.
We illustrate the robustness of the findings by considering the truncated nature in our sample.
The OLS estimations are likely to be biased due to the truncated nature of the sample because we
observe only those firms that actually issued corporate bonds and lack information on firms that
wanted raise funds, but had to give up, such as electric companies, even those with investment-
grade credit ratings. We account for this problem and estimate a sample selection model as a
robustness check. The results are qualitatively similar to the main results. This paper proceeds
as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the background of Japan’s corporate bond market. Section
3 describes the data used to estimate the models. Section 4 details the variables and estimation
methodology, and Section 5 presents estimation results. We present concluding remarks in Section
6.
2 Background
At $ 11 trillion, the Japanese bond market is the second largest in the world behind the United
States at $ 37 trillion as of Q4 2015, according to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The
bond market was largely dominated by government bonds due to its size and liquidity. All bonds
issued in the Japanese corporate bond market are investment-grade,2 and defaults on corporate
bonds are rare. Thus, the Japanese corporate bond market is considered non-volatile and provides
issuers with long-term funding.
In the past 20 years, the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake
were major economic events striking both the Japanese corporate bonds market and Japan’s econ-
omy. In 2008, the Japanese straight corporate bond market experienced its first straight corporate
bond default in seven years during this period of credit market turmoil. During 2008-2010, eleven
cases of straight corporate bond defaults caused a sharp increase in credit spreads in the secondary
2Although there are speculative grade (below investment-grade) corporate bonds in the secondary market, they
were originally issued with ratings in the investment-grade category, but the credit rating was downgraded and the
possibility of default increased markedly.
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market. Then, the BOJ’s efforts to support market liquidity and its policy-based financing to facil-
itate corporate financing calmed the market turmoil.
The recent financial crisis also influenced the primary market for Japanese corporate bonds,
where the amount issued during 2008 decreased by about 4% to about 8.8 trillion yen, and the num-
ber of issues decreased by 26.9%, according to the Japan Securities Dealers Association. However,
the financial crisis was triggered not by an endogenous shock but by an exogenous shock stemming
from the collapse of the housing and securitization markets in the U.S. The amounts issued in 2009
increased to 11.4 trillion yen, which was even higher than before the financial crisis.
The events following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s
(TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on March 11, 2011 had a severe impact on the
Japanese economy. In the aftermath of this tragic event, authorities decided to conduct policies
for economic and financial stability from dimensional channels, including an international inter-
vention in exchange rate markets (see Neely (2011)). This event had a dramatic impact on the
Japanese corporate bond market because TEPCO was Japan’s largest corporate bond issuer, with
about 5 trillion yen ($ 60.9 billion) of outstanding corporate bonds when the disaster occurred (The
Nikkei, April 21, 2011). The credit spreads for outstanding TEPCO corporate bonds jumped to
about 400-500 basis points after the earthquake and tsunami, from just 8 basis points before the
disaster.3 Due to this disaster, TEPCO was unable to raise funds from the public offered bond mar-
ket for about six and a half years. Moreover, rating institutions downgraded other Japanese electric
power companies as well, which were principal issuers in the corporate bond market due to greater
regulatory uncertainty and lower profitability and cash flows. The first corporate bond issued by
an electric power company after the nuclear disaster was in June 2011 by Okinawa Electric Power
Company, the only one of the ten electric power companies with no nuclear power plant, and this
issue was relatively small. It took more than a year for other electric power companies to issue
a corporate bond after the nuclear disaster event due to the greater uncertainty relating to nuclear
power plants.
In contrast with movements in the credit spreads in the secondary market, credit spreads in the
primary market were back to its level before the nuclear disaster event within a few months, as the
business environment, particularly supply chains, was recovering. Moreover, the BOJ faced a task
of outstanding significance in reviving the damaged economy. It rushed to bolster markets in the
3Uranaka, T. (2011, May 2, Japan says no limits to Tepco liability from nuclear disaster Reuters)
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wake of this disaster.
[Figure 1 around here]
As Figure 1 shows, the BOJ’s JGB holdings dramatically increased after the Great East Japan
earthquake, reaching 30% of JGB outstanding amounts. This caused a decline in interest rates
across the yield curve of JGBs, and their yields dropped to record lows. This implies that the BOJ’s
massive purchases of JGBs could affect the corporate bond spreads in the primary market through
a parallel shift down in the yield curve, which appears to help firms raise funds by decreasing the
cost of funding; however, investors do not find that the record low credit spreads compensate for
their credit risk compared to some risk-free interest rates, such as banks’ reserves at the central
bank, which have a positive 0.1 % rate as of November 2015.
One characteristic of the JGB market is its rather low interest rate, although Japan has a very
high debt to GDP ratio. Large budget deficits and outstanding JGBs since the 2008 global financial
crisis were followed by the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake downgrade of Japan’s credit rating.
Outstanding government bonds and borrowings increased to 1,049.4 trillion yen by the end of
March 2016. Considering the size of the country’s deficit and borrowing level, JGB interest rate
levels seems puzzling. One possible explanation for this relationship is that JGBs are held mostly
by citizens of Japan (about 90%). While the puzzling relationship between the low JGB yield and
high debt to GDP ratio is interesting, this study focuses on the relationship with the stock of JGBs
and corporate bond spreads, which we examine empirically in the following sections.
3 Data
This study focuses on exploring the convenience yield on government bonds as well as other
factors contributing to credit spreads in the Japanese corporate bond market, in particular when the
BOJ expanded its monetary easing. To analyze this question, we constructed a new dataset from
data on individual corporate bond issues, issuers’ financial data, data on the bookrunner market,
and business cycle and macroeconomic data.
We collected data on straight corporate bonds issued publicly by individual corporations from
January 1, 1995 until November 30, 2015 from the Thomson One Investment Banking database.
This dataset includes credit spreads (spread over JGBs with the same maturity), issue amounts,
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the maturity of the issue, mortgages associated with the issue, the bookrunners’ names, the num-
ber of the issue, and ratings information. We collected details of any mortgages and guarantees
associated with the issue collected from the Nikkei newspaper dataset, Nikkei Telecom 21. We
gathered information on the bookrunner’s type from Nikkei Telecom 21 and the websites of each
bookrunner. We calculated the market share of each bookrunner from their annual league tables in
the Thomson One Investment Banking database. To maximize the sample size, we used the lowest
of the available ratings provided by four ratings institutions, Rating and Investment Information,
the Japan Credit Rating Agency, the Japan Bond Rating Institute, and Standard and Poors. We
proxied the monthly market size by the total value of new issues of straight corporate bonds in its
issuing month based on data obtained from the Japan Securities Dealers Association.
We collected issuers’ financial data from the Nikkei NEEDS Corporate Financial Data and
Japanese Company Handbook quarterly published by Toyo Keizai. We matched issuers’ financial
data in the accounting year immediately prior to each bond issue with the corporate bond issue
dataset. Financial data such as ROE, revenue, and the total debt to total capital ratio for the latest
fiscal year, is not available for unlisted companies.
We gathered the monthly data on the business cycle such as corporate goods price index
(CGPI), consumer price index (CPI), and index of industrial production (IIP), from the BOJ’s
website, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Com-
munications, and Nikkei NEEDS Macro Data. Data on the balance of JGBs held by the BOJ is
available at a monthly frequency from January 1996, and quarterly data on the Japanese govern-
ment’s debt-to-GDP ratio (general gross government debt % of gross domestic product) is available
for the whole sample period. We collected these data from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
Tables 1 and 2 report the mean values of various bond characteristics. Although this dataset
includes only nineteen issuers of general mortgage corporate bonds,4 Table 1 shows that 13.19%
of all issues are general mortgage bonds because electric power companies were among these
nineteen issuers. The dataset also contains bonds secured by the issuer’s pledge of a specific asset
under the Secured Bonds Trust Act, referred to as Collateral. Issues of this type of corporate bond
is concentrated at the beginning of the sample period. Columns 2 and 3 show that the credit spreads
after the Great East Japan earthquake are significantly lower.
4A general mortgage corporate bond is a type of secured corporate bond issued by companies founded under the
Special Acts, and is naturally backed by all of the issuer’s property.
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The mean value of issue size is smaller after March 11, 2011. While the lower credit spread
after March 11, 2011 means lower fund raising costs, the issue size shrank. This suggests that
issuers having raised the larger size of the issue, such as electric companies, do not raise a large
sum each time, as was the case before the nuclear disaster. The ratio of issues underwritten by bank
subsidiary securities companies after the disaster is about 1.5 times more than before the disaster.
The ratio of corporate bonds underwritten by foreign bookrunners after the disaster is about half
of the value before the disaster. This implies that mergers and acquisitions by Japanese securities
companies during this decade overwhelmed foreign bookrunners’ market share.
Table 2 shows that the credit spread after March 11, 2011 is lower across all rating classes than
before this date. The mean Maturity in Table 1 does not show the significant difference between
before and after March 11, 2011. On the other hand, the mean Maturity for A and BBB rating
classes is larger after March 11, 2011, and is larger for the higher rating classes throughout the
sample period. Among the three indices for issuer’s financial health, the mean ROE increased
after March 11, 2011 across the rating classes. In particular, the ROE for the BBB rating class
is about double what it was before. This suggests an improvement in the issuer’s profitability.
Bank subsidiary bookrunners’ market share increased in all rating classes, as the bank subsidiary
securities companies continued to grow after their entry to the bond underwriting market in 1993.
In contrast, the share of foreign bookrunners decreased notably in the A and BBB rating classes.
The results based on cross-sectional means are simple comparisons that ignore the impact of all
other variables that differ between groups. However, these results suggest that we should consider
the possibility of changes in the corporate bond market caused by the Great East Japan earthquake
and unconventional monetary policy.
4 Estimation methodology
In this section, we estimate models to identify factors that help explain credit spreads. Fol-
lowing Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), we assume three factors determining credit
spreads: expected default on corporate bonds, risk premium associated with the covariance be-
tween default and the pricing kernel, and the convenience yield on Treasuries. The convenience
yield in their model is novel in that it incorporates a factor in which agents derive utility directly
from holding a convenience asset, which affects the corporate bond spreads.
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Under their convenience yield hypothesis, the representative agent maximizesE
∑∞
t=1 β
tu(Ct),
where Ct is the sum of an endowment of ct plus ‘convenience’ benefits ν(·)
Ct = ct + ν(θ
A
t ,GDPt; ξt).
The benefits are a function of the real holdings of convenience assets, θAt , which captures the
idea that holding more government bonds reduces the costs that would otherwise be incurred by
transacting in a less liquid security like corporate bonds. The agent’s real holdings of convenience
assets θAt include both government bonds, θ
T
t , and any other private sector assets, θ
P
t which provide
services similar to government bonds: θAt = θ
T
t + k
P θPt . The constant k
P is denoted as a measure
of the convenience services provided by the private-sector assets relative to treasuries. The term
ξt in the convenience function is a preference shock that affects how much utility is derived from
convenience assets such as a flight-to-quality during a financial crisis. The convenience function
is homogeneous of degree one in GDPt and θAt , so the liquidity benefits double if both income and
convenience assets double,
v
(
θAt
GDPt
; ξt
)
GDPt ≡ ν(θAt , GDPt; ξt).
Then, we assume that the convenience function is increasing in θAt /GDPt, but the marginal conve-
nience benefit is decreasing in θAt /GDPt, and has the property limθAt /GDPt→∞ ν
′(θAt /GDPt; ξt) = 0.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) consider that the benefits of government bonds
are their liquidity and safety attributes. The definition of the yield spread between τ -period corpo-
rate and government bonds is:5
St,τ =
t+τ−1∑
j=t
1
τ
Et[v
′(θAj /GDPj; ξj)] +
t+τ−1∑
j=t
1
τ
Et[λjDj]−
t+τ−1∑
j=t
1
τ
Covt(mj+1, Rj+1), (1)
where mj+1 = logMj+1(= log β[u′(Cj+1)/u′(Cj)](Qj/Qj+1)) is the log pricing kernel and Rj+1
is the one-period excess return of corporate bonds over government bonds.
Although Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) use annual data to test their theoretical
model, we examine the convenience yield theory using issue-level data to further explain the re-
maining variation in corporate bond credit spreads that can be attributed to the financial health of
the issuer and issue-specific characteristics.
5Appendix A of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) provides the derivation of this spread expression.
8
The empirical analysis in this study starts with the baseline specification for corporate bond
spreads, which follows Duffie and Singleton (1999) closely, to reflect the probability that the cor-
porate bond may default,
PCt = [λt(1−Dt) + (1− λt)]Et[Mt+1PCt+1] ≈ e−λtDtEt[Mt+1PCt+1]. (2)
The price for the multi-period bond, PCt , is a function of the probability that the corporate bond
may default, λt.
The set of explanatory variables in the baseline model includes the financial health of the issuer,
characteristics of the issue, proxies for business cycle, and bookrunner characteristics. The basic
estimated equation for the whole sample period is of the following form:
CSij =αi + β1Financial health of the issuerij + β2Issue characteristicsij
+ β3Business cyclej + β4Bookrunner characteristicsij + ϵij
(3)
where CSij is the credit spread for issue j by firm i, βi is a vector of parameters, and ϵij is an
error term. Based on the literature on credit spreads, the first vector of variables, Financial health
of the issuer, are the following: the AAA (AA and A) rating is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the
value of unity if the issuing firm’s rating is AAA+, AAA, or AAA- (AA+, AA or AA-, and A+, A
or A-), and zero otherwise. The rating variables AAA (AA and A) relate to the issuer’s financial
condition.6 Previous studies suggest that stronger financial conditions for the issuing firm will
reduce the probability of default λ; that is, the credit spread is lower. Compared with a base rating
of BBB, AAA ratings (AA and A ratings) indicate an improvement in the firm’s financial condition
and we can expect this to decrease the credit spread.
The second vector, Issue characteristics, includes variables to control for the characteristics of
issues: LOG(AMOUNT) is the log of the individual bond issue size; MATURITY is the duration
to maturity in years; COLLATERAL is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of unity if the bond
is secured by the issuer’s pledge of a specific asset under the Secured Bonds Trust Act (Act No. 52
of 1905), and zero otherwise; GENERAL MORTGAGE BOND is a 0-1 dummy variable taking
the value of unity if the bond is a general mortgage bond, and zero otherwise; GUARANTEED
(HIGHER RATING) is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of unity if the principal and interest
of bond is guaranteed by the company for which the rating is higher than that for the issuing
6We use no other variable for the issuer’s financial condition as a variable in the baseline model to maximize the
sample size because this dataset includes many unlisted companies, for which financial data is not available.
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company,7 and zero otherwise; GUARANTEED (SUBSIDIARY) is a 0-1 dummy variable taking
the value of unity if the principal and interest of the bond is guaranteed by the issuer’s subsidiary,8
and zero otherwise.
The variable LOG(AMOUNT) relates to the issuer’s repayment ability, as a larger sized bond
issue requires a future cash flow or level of tangible assets high enough to pay the debt back,
so we expect that increases in LOG(AMOUNT) will decrease the credit spread. Additionally,
we include MATURITY, COLLATERAL, GENERAL MORTGAGE BOND, GUARANTEED
(HIGHER RATING), and GUARANTEED (SUBSIDIARY) to reflect the non-pricing terms of
each bond issue. As the term to maturity increases, the investor is concerned more about future
economic situation. We would expect a higher credit spread for bonds with a long-term maturity
due to the risk associated with time. Secured or guaranteed bonds can be seen as less risky than
unsecured bonds are, since bondholders will be compensated for their investment in the event of
default before any unsecured bonds are repaid. Therefore, we would expect a lower credit spread
for any secured and guaranteed bonds.
The third vector, Business cycle, contains a set of macroeconomic variables to control for the
differences in economic activity through the sample period: LOG(SIZE) is the log of the market
size for straight corporate bonds; ∆CPI is the growth rate of the CPI (2010 base, YoY); ∆IIP
is the growth rate of the IIP (2010 base, YoY); ∆CGPI is the growth rate of the CGPI (2010
base, YoY). Stock and Watson (2003) provide an excellent survey showing that asset prices such
as corporate bond spreads are forward-looking and reflect the business cycle. These variables
control for changes in market conditions and business cycle fluctuations. When the corporate bond
market size expands, investors are likely to expect a higher return in the growing market, and we
would expect a higher credit spread. Improvement in business activity is likely to boost investor
confidence and reduce the risk of corporate defaults, so the higher growth rate of the index of
industrial production would lower the credit spread (Athanassakos and Carayannopoulos (2001)).
The fourth vector, Bookrunner characteristics, contains variables for the bookrunner of each
7In this case, the rating for the bond is higher than that for the issuing company. For example, Yasuda Fire and
Marine Insurance, which has a AAA rating, guaranteed the corporate bond issued by Topy Industries, Limited, whose
rating was BBB; then, the rating for this corporate bond was AAA. It was reported that for Topy Industries, Limited,
the fund raising costs, including the guarantee charge and commission, were lower by more than 0.8% compared to
the case without a guarantee (Nikkei Financial Daily, April 23, 1998).
8In this case, the subsidiary operational company with more stable cash flow guarantees the bonds issued by its
holding company.
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bond issue: BOOKRUNNER’S MARKET SHARE is the bookrunner’s market share in the year
immediately prior to the issuing year, FOREIGN BOOKRUNNER is a 0-1 dummy variable taking
the value of unity if the bookrunner is foreign, and BANK SUBSIDIARY is a 0-1 dummy variable
taking the value of unity if the bookrunner is a bank subsidiary securities company. We use the
bookrunner’s market share as a proxy for its ability following previous studies (Carter and Man-
aster, 1990, Krigman et al., 2001), and given that many studies such as Beatty and Ritter (1986)
and Carter (1992) show that the reputation effect would help lower fund raising costs. Thus, we
expect a lower spread for a bond issue underwritten by a bookrunner with a large market share. The
Financial System Reform Act in 1993 allowed banks to enter the underwriting market through a
securities firm subsidiary BANK SUBSIDIARY. Based on the strong firm-bank relationship in the
Japanese financial system, (see, e.g., Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Aoki and Patrick (1995)), it
is possible that the certification effect will exist. With the bank’s superior information, the certifi-
cation effect should lower the credit spreads of the issue whose bookrunner is the bank subsidiary
securities company.9 We expect that foreign bookrunners will have long experience in overseas
markets and a network, and its reputation is also likely to lower the credit spread, as Lopes and
Spiegel (2014) suggest.
In addition to the baseline model, we include dummy variables for financial crisis and nuclear
disaster in the model to capture a flight-to-quality shock, ξ in equation (1). LEHMAN COLLAPSE
is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of unity if the bond is issued after the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy (September 15, 2008) and before April 1, 2009,10 and zero otherwise; and NUCLEAR
DISASTER is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of unity if the bond is issued after March 11,
2011, and zero otherwise. The collapse of Lehman Brothers made investors more sensitive to risk
and require a higher risk premium. We expect that the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy would cause
an increase in credit spreads. We discuss the effects of the nuclear disaster in Section 2.
Then, we include the key variable, LOG(DEBT/GDP) in the estimation model to test the con-
venience yield hypothesis. The term θA/GDP in equation (1) includes both government bond
debt and private-sector convenience assets. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) point
out that the maturity structure of government debt is likely to be endogenous, because both the
9Although the examination for the certification effect and underwriter choice is not the focus of this study, Takaoka
and McKenzie (2006) use Japanese data to test the endogeneity of a BANK SUBSIDIARY underwriter and show the
null hypothesis that BANK SUBSIDIARY is exogenous cannot be rejected.
10The end point of the Lehman collapse dummy is when the IIP increased in Japan for the first time after the Lehman
collapse. While we tested different end points, the estimation results are essentially the same.
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private sector and the issuance of government bonds actively manages the maturity structure of
debt. To avoid any endogeneity issues stemming from debt financing behavior, we use the gov-
ernment debt-to-GDP ratio as an instrument for θTt /GDPt following their estimation strategy of
using the instrumental variables (IV) regressions. The theoretical implication in Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) is that the increase in the sock of government bonds will decrease
the difference between the corporate and government bond yields; that is, the credit spreads will
be lower and we expect a negative sign.
As an additional test to account for the stock of government bonds available to investors and
monetary policy stance, we include the balance of government bonds held by the BOJ as a stock of
JGB, the JGB HOLDING RATIO, in the regressions. As the amount of JGB available to investors
decreases, investors may be willing to pay more of a premium to hold the scarcer remaining JGB.
Through a Treasury buyback program in U.S., Longstaff (2004) shows strong empirical support
for the hypothesis that the premium reflects the relative importance of Treasuries as a safe haven
for investors as the supply of Treasury bonds available to investors decreases. The correlation
between the LOG(DEBT/GDP) and JGB HOLDING RATIO is so high (0.91) after March 11,
2011, that we estimate the LOG(DEBT/GDP) and JGB HOLDING RATIO separately. To void
any endogeneity issues stemming from managing the maturity structure of debt and government
behavior, we use the log of the balance of government bonds held by the BOJ (hundred millions of
yen) and quarterly dummies as instrumental variables for the JGB HOLDING RATIO.
5 Estimation Results
We estimated equation (3) using a firm fixed effects model. The Hausman statistic for the spec-
ification test to determine the preferred specification of the common effects model indicates that
the fixed effects model is the preferred specification for this dataset. Table 3 shows the estimated
coefficients and their t-ratios computed with the robust covariance matrix correction for the vari-
ables in equation (3). The first column reports estimates for the baseline specification. The base
rating group for the issuer’s financial health is the BBB rating and each estimated coefficient for
the rating dummies are negative, as expected, and the estimated coefficient is larger in absolute
value as the rating improves. All three coefficients are significant, indicating that a worsening
of the issuer’s ratings makes investors seek a higher return. The credit spread for a large issue
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size bond is significantly lower, which is consistent with the expectation. The sign of the coef-
ficient on MATURITY is consistent with the expectation, but not significant. The credit spread
for general mortgage bonds is not significantly lower. Among the secured and guaranteed bonds,
the credit spread for bonds secured by the issuer’s pledge of a specific asset is significant.11 The
estimated coefficients for the variables to capture the effect of the business cycle on credit spreads
are significant and consistent with expectations.
The specification in the second column adds the bookrunner’s characteristics. For a proxy of
bookrunner’s ability, the positive coefficient on bookrunner’s market share is consistent with the
reputation effect that reputable bookrunners provide more accurate information to maintain their
reputations; rational investors who understand this incentive buys corporate bonds underwritten by
a reputable bookrunner with lower returns. The significantly lower spread for bonds underwritten
by foreign bookrunners reflects their reputation of having long experience in overseas markets and
a network. The certification effect measured by BANK SUBSIDIARY is not significant.
Next, the third column includes dummies for the Lehman collapse and the nuclear disaster
events. The theoretical implication for the unexpected disaster is that a flight-to-quality shock
would increase credit spreads because investors want to decrease their portfolio exposure to credit
risk. The effect of the Lehman collapse is significantly positive, but the credit spread is significantly
lower after the nuclear disaster event. The sign of the estimated coefficient for the Lehman collapse
is consistent with the theoretical implication, but that for the nuclear disaster is not. Behind this
phenomenon, the period for the nuclear disaster (after March 11, 2011 to the endpoint of sample
period)12 may be too long to capture the temporary flight-to-quality shock, but this result implies
the possibility of a structural change after March 11, 2011, and we thus divide and examine the
sample separately.
Table 4 shows the results of testing the convenience yield hypothesis in the OLS and IV speci-
fications using all observations. Due to data availability, we dropped bonds issued in 1995 from the
sample, resulting in no variation in COLLATERAL. Columns 1-4 show that the sign of the log of
debt-to-GDP ratio is significantly negative. The estimated coefficients on the remaining variables
are similar to those in Table 3. We also see a convenience yield on government bonds in Japan,
11The rating for the guaranteed bond is already upgraded to that of the guarantor. While the estimated coefficient
for the secured bond is significantly negative, a comparison of other guarantee or general mortgage types is difficult
due to the small sample size (only five secured bonds).
12The unconventional monetary easing expanded since the nuclear disaster, so the endpoint of this dummy variable
is set to the endpoint of the sample period.
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even after controlling for the financial health of the issuer, issue characteristics, and bookrunner
characteristics. This result seems robust across the estimation methods (OLS and IV).
In order to explore whether the convenience yield has differential effects on issues with dif-
ferent credit quality, we divided the observations in this dataset into three groups: those with high
ratings (AAA and AA), those with an upper-medium rating (A), and those with a lower-medium
rating (BBB). For these three groups, the estimated models for credit spreads include three vari-
ables to control for the financial condition of the issuer within the same rating class: debt to capital
ratio, log of sales amounts, and ROE. While we exclude unlisted companies who do not have fi-
nancial data available, Table 5 shows that the convenience yield is significant in all rating classes,
and its effect differs among rating classes. There is a big gap between the BBB rating class and
the other rating classes, which is consistent with the effect of the safety attribute of government
bonds in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), in which the effect is larger for spreads in
the lower rating class.
Then, we divide the observations into two groups: those issued before and after March 11,
2011. Table 6 shows the results. We see the convenience yield on government bonds in both
sample periods. While the estimated coefficients on the rating variables and business cycle are
not significant at the 5% level in the latter sample group, the estimated coefficient on the conve-
nience yield, log(debt/GDP), is significant and its size is much larger. As in Section 2 and Figure
1, the biggest event in both the corporate and government bond markets during this period is the
unprecedented degree of monetary easing. Due to the BOJ’s monetary stimulus program aiming
to bolster markets quickly in the wake of the Great East Japan earthquake, the BOJ’s balance of
JGB dramatically increased after the earthquake, reaching 30% of JGB outstanding amounts. Al-
though the decrease in the amount of government bonds available to investors might increase the
premium by reflecting the relative importance of JGBs as a safe haven for investors, the BOJ’s
unprecedented monetary easing operation decreased many interest rates significantly, and the vari-
able JGB HOLDING RATIO can measure the different effect under the unconventional monetary
policy regime.
Table 7 shows the results for three different sample periods: full sample, before March 11,
2011, and thereafter. The correlation between LOG(DEBT/GDP) and JGB HOLDING RATIO
is so high (0.91) after March 11, 2011 that we estimated them separately. Their correlation co-
efficients for the full sample and before March 11, 2011 are -0.05 and -0.76, respectively. The
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convenience yield remains significant across sample periods, even after controlling the stock of
JGB held by the BOJ. The signs of the estimated coefficients on the JGB HOLDING RATIO are
the opposite in the periods before and after March 11, 2011. Its positive coefficient in the period
before March 11, 2011 suggests that the higher credit spread reflects the premium investors are
willing to pay to hold the scarcer remaining government bonds. On the other hand, assuming
this variable as a proxy for the unconventional monetary policy stance after March 11, 2011, the
negative coefficient indicates that the BOJ’s unprecedented monetary easing was so potent that it
decreased corporate bond spreads as the degree of monetary easing expanded.
We also divide the observations after March 11, 2011 into three groups by rating class, as in
Table 5, to examine the differing effects of the JGB HOLDING RATIO, which is a proxy for the
monetary policy stance. Table 8 gives the results for these three groups. The estimated models
include variables to control for the financial condition of the issuer within the same rating class, as
in Table 5. The results indicate that the credit spreads for BBB-rated corporate bonds decreased
markedly. Monetary easing through the BOJ’s massive purchases of JGBs affected corporate bond
spreads for all issues, in particular those issued in the lower rating class.
To check the robustness of the results, we estimated the credit spread models after March
11, 2011 with a sample selection model with incidental truncation. The unprecedented degree of
monetary easing by the BOJ lowered the interest rates yield curves of JGB and corporate bonds.
The extremely low interest rates appear to help firms raise funds by decreasing the cost of funding;
however, investors do not find the credit spreads at record lows reflect the compensation they
receive for bearing credit risk compared to some risk-free interest rates, such as banks’ reserves
at the BOJ, that had a positive rate of 0.1 % as of November 2015. In fact, the total amount of
corporate bonds issued in 2015 decreased by 18%. It was reported that the credit spreads at record
lows increase the risk of being unsold, and some firms gave up plans to issue corporate bonds.
The estimations are likely to be biased due to the truncated nature of the sample. We observe only
those firms that actually issued corporate bonds, and have not information about firms that wanted
to raise funds but had to give up. As a robustness check, we estimate a sample selection model
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with incidental truncation (Bloom and Killingsworth (1985)):
CS = β′x+ ϵ,
z∗ = α′w + u,
z = 1 if z∗ > 0, z = 0 if z∗ ≤ 0,
ϵ, u ∼, N [0, 0, σ2ϵ , 1, ρ],
(4)
where CS is the credit spread, z∗ is a latent variable, and the dependent variable and explanatory
variables are observed iff z∗ > 0. A probit model applies to z. We obtain observations on credit
spreads and factors that influence the credit spread level and z∗ only when z equals one, but the
model is identified as long as ρ is nonzero, and can be estimated by maximum likelihood. The
second and fourth columns in Table 9 indicate that the results for the convenience yield and the
JGB HOLDING RATIO are qualitatively similar to the main results. Therefore, the findings are
not driven by the incidental truncation.
6 Conclusion
This study investigates the factors that contribute to credit spreads in the primary market for
Japanese corporate bonds and how these factors changed when the BOJ implemented various un-
conventional monetary policy measures empirically. In addition, the model incorporates the con-
venience yield on government bonds, which existing literature largely ignores, especially in firm-
and issue-level analyses. Previous studies examining the premium in Treasury bonds or the Trea-
sury convenience yield focus on the aggregate behavior of yield spreads such as credit spreads.
However, credit spreads vary with firm- or issue-specific characteristics. The issue-level analysis
in this study allowed us to integrate the convenience yield on government bonds with the firm- and
issue-specific characteristics that can explain the remaining variations in the credit spreads. The
results show that the convenience yield on government bonds, as well as firm- and issue-specific
characteristics, are significant factors explaining credit spreads.
Furthermore, the estimation results suggest that the factors explaining the credit spreads changed
under the unconventional monetary policy regime. For instance, the variables to measure the busi-
ness cycle were significant and consistent with the predictions, but became insignificant. Addition-
ally, credit ratings have little explanatory power for the credit spreads under the unconventional
monetary policy regime. Investors became less sensitive to the risk of default that issuers with
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different credit quality have, partly due to the unprecedented degree of monetary easing. Mean-
while, the Japanese government’s debt-to-GDP ratio, which is a measure of the convenience yield
on government bonds, is significant throughout the sample period and a driver of credit spreads in
Japan.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Corporate Bond Characteristics
Whole period Before 3/11/2011 After 3/11/2011
Credit Spread (bps) 45.97 50.34 31.64
Amount (millions of yen) 19,687 20,418 17,291
Maturity (years) 6.98 7.01 6.91
Rating
AAA (%) 6.02 7.78 0.29
AA (%) 34.67 36.09 30.01
A (%) 47.75 44.50 58.39
BBB (%) 11.56 11.63 11.31
Secured Bonds Types
Collateral (%) 0.07 0.09 0
General Mortgage (%) 13.19 14.78 7.98
Guaranteed by higher rating firm (%) 0.15 0.20 0
Guaranteed by subsidiary (%) 0.89 0.78 1.22
Bookrunner Type
Bank Subsidiary (%) 49.28 44.47 65.04
Foreign Bookrunner (%) 4.21 4.78 2.33
Sample Size 7,338 5,622 1,7167
Notes: Sample period: 1995:1- 2015:11; Number of firms=646.
This table contains cross-sectional means of various characteristics.
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Table 3: Determinants of Credit Spreads in Japan: Firm Fixed Effects
Characteristics Characteristics Dummies for Lehman
of an issue of a bookrunner and nuclear events
Variable Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
AAA rating -68.52 (8.54)∗∗∗ -69.25 (8.72)∗∗∗ -66.43 (8.30)∗∗∗
AA rating -50.69 (8.12)∗∗∗ -51.65 (8.30)∗∗∗ -51.16 (8.21)∗∗∗
A rating -31.55 (5.88)∗∗∗ -32.12 (6.02)∗∗∗ -31.47 (5.94)∗∗∗
log(Amount) -2.79 (1.74)∗ -1.73 (1.06) -2.01 (1.30)
Maturity 0.05 (0.25) 0.09 (0.43) 0.09 (0.43)
Collateral -57.14 (14.74)∗∗∗ -56.76 (14.79)∗∗∗ -53.30 (12.41)∗∗∗
General mortgage bond 3.77 (0.49) 2.84 (0.37) 2.69 (0.35)
Guaranteed (higher rating) -10.08 (0.94) -9.43 (0.89) -9.21 (0.84)
Guaranteed (subsidiary) 11.58 (0.45) 10.47 (0.43) 10.14 (0.41)
log(Size) 14.66 (11.30)∗∗∗ 14.06 (10.81)∗∗∗ 13.52 (10.36)∗∗∗
∆CPI 3.66 (5.66)∗∗∗ 3.02 (4.81)∗∗∗ 4.64 (6.30)∗∗∗
∆IIP -0.53 (4.97)∗∗∗ -0.52 (4.93)∗∗∗ -0.40 (3.08)∗∗∗
∆CGPI -2.69 (6.12)∗∗∗ -2.54 (5.83)∗∗∗ -3.24 (6.28)∗∗∗
Bookrunner’s market share -0.60 (6.63)∗∗∗ -0.61 (6.81)∗∗∗
Foreign Bookrunner -10.70 (2.61)∗∗∗ -11.20 (2.72)∗∗∗
Bank Subsidiary -1.18 (0.87) -0.91 (0.69)
Lehman collapse 11.87 (2.68)∗∗∗
Nuclear disaster -10.47 (3.18)∗∗∗
Sample Size 7,338 7,338 7,338
R2 0.59 0.60 0.60
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of asymptotic t-statistics computed with
the robust covariance matrix correction. The estimated coefficients and t-ratios of a quarterly
trend variable are not reported. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 4: Supply of Government Bonds and Credit Spreads: Firm Fixed Effects
Full Sample (OLS) Full Sample (IV)
AAA rating -82.57 -83.59 -78.47 -74.15
(9.30)∗∗∗ (9.70)∗∗∗ (24.16)∗∗∗ (22.95)∗∗∗
AA rating -56.81 -59.55 -54.63 -53.70
(8.28)∗∗∗ (8.63)∗∗∗ (24.11)∗∗∗ (23.86)∗∗∗
A rating -34.96 -36.22 -33.48 -32.49
(5.83)∗∗∗ (6.12)∗∗∗ (18.97)∗∗∗ (18.48)∗∗∗
log(Amount) -1.31 -1.23 -1.57 -1.31
(0.90) (0.88) (1.96)∗∗ (1.63)
Maturity 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07
(0.28) (0.36) (0.43) (0.65)
log(debt/GDP) -52.06 -83.17 -30.85 -18.60
(7.23)∗∗∗ (8.35)∗∗∗ (26.64)∗∗∗ (12.04)∗∗∗
General mortgage bond 1.17 0.85 1.46 1.47
(0.16) (0.12) (0.24) (0.24)
Guaranteed (higher rating) -11.65 -9.49 -12.07 -11.02
(1.10) (0.91) (1.14) (1.05)
Guaranteed (subsidiary) 11.32 9.95 11.40 10.23
(0.44) (0.38) (1.80)∗ (1.62)
log(Size) 11.86 9.97 12.15 11.66
(9.34)∗∗∗ (8.05)∗∗∗ (15.65)∗∗∗ (14.97)∗∗∗
∆CPI -1.17 -0.98 0.78 2.92
(1.32) (1.14) (1.72)∗ (5.59)∗∗∗
∆IIP -0.65 -0.62 -0.59 -0.42
(6.61)∗∗∗ (5.54)∗∗∗ (12.70)∗∗∗ (7.86)∗∗∗
∆CGPI -0.54 -0.41 -1.42 -2.50
(1.09) (0.94) (5.84)∗∗∗ (9.56)∗∗∗
Bookrunner’s market share -0.35 -0.46
(3.80)∗∗∗ (7.28)∗∗∗
Foreign Bookrunner -5.33 -8.87
(1.35) (4.22)∗∗∗
Bank subsidiary bookrunner -0.47 -0.33
(0.39) (0.39)
Lehman collapse 8.75 13.84
(2.21)∗∗ (4.10)∗∗∗
Nuclear disaster -22.66 -9.51
(5.47)∗∗∗ (7.44)∗∗∗
Sample Size 7,103 7,103 7,103 7,103
R2 0.63 0.64
Cor. 0.79 0.80
Notes: As for Table 3. Cor. refers to the correlation between the actual and fitted values.
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Table 5: Supply of Government Bonds and Credit Spreads by Rating Class: Firm Fixed Effects
(IV specification)
Rating Class
AAA-AA ratings A rating BBB rating
Debt to Capital 15.03 85.44 92.23
(4.18)∗∗∗ (6.01)∗∗∗ (2.16)∗∗
log(Sale) 4.78 -7.63 27.93
(1.96)∗∗ (2.54)∗∗ (3.21)∗∗
ROE -1.00 -0.73 -0.44
(12.77)∗∗∗ (10.86)∗∗∗ (5.22)∗∗∗
log(Amount) -0.35 -0.90 -8.71
(0.41) (0.63) (1.99)∗∗
Maturity 0.55 -0.22 -2.99
(6.77)∗∗∗ (0.82) (2.63)∗∗
log(debt/GDP) -7.40 -6.43 -50.90
(4.90)∗∗∗ (2.14)∗∗ (4.82)∗∗∗
General mortgage bond -4.74
(1.36)
Guaranteed (subsidiary) 14.53 26.81
(0.81) (1.87)∗
log(Size) 9.88 12.25 11.71
(12.44)∗∗∗ (9.43)∗∗∗ (3.17)∗∗
∆CPI 2.01 6.91 -0.05
(3.34)∗∗∗ (7.96)∗∗∗ (0.02)
∆IIP -0.59 -0.47 -0.42
(11.61)∗∗∗ (4.96)∗∗∗ (1.48)
∆CGPI 0.55 -4.08 -5.63
(1.95)∗ (9.36)∗∗∗ (4.32)∗∗∗
Lehman collapse 6.49 8.34 38.86
(2.65)∗∗∗ (0.59) (1.22)
Nuclear disaster -8.49 -15.41 1.63
(6.00)∗∗∗ (6.91)∗∗∗ (0.27)
Sample Size 2,373 3,006 769
Cor. 0.79 0.76 0.83
Notes: Sample period: 1996:1-2015:11. As for Table 4. Bonds with collateral or guaranteed by
a higher rating firm are not included due to the absence of observations or no variation within a
rating class.
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Table 6: Supply of Government Bonds and Credit Spreads before and after the Great East Japan
Earthquake (March 11, 2011): Firm Fixed Effects (IV specification)
Before March 11, 2011 After March 11, 2011
AAA rating -67.44 -20.94
(16.36)∗∗∗ (1.80)∗
AA rating -52.82 -10.99
(18.06)∗∗∗ (1.90)∗
A rating -33.07 -6.93
(14.99)∗∗∗ (1.32)
log(Amount) -3.57 1.27
(3.59)∗∗ (1.14)
Maturity 0.08 1.03
(0.62) (6.32)∗∗∗
log(debt/GDP) -12.59 -174.11
(6.95)∗∗∗ (6.03)∗∗∗
General mortgage bond 0.88
(0.14)
Guaranteed (higher rating) -16.41
(1.45)
Guaranteed (subsidiary) 21.92 55.21
(2.50)∗∗ (5.51)∗∗∗
log(Size) 15.53 0.43
(14.86)∗∗∗ (0.47)
∆CPI 9.73 0.03
(11.11)∗∗∗ (0.03)
∆IIP -0.26 -0.08
(4.00)∗∗ (0.81)
∆CGPI -4.54 -1.15
(11.66)∗∗∗ (2.76)∗∗
Lehman collapse 15.26
(4.17)∗∗∗
Sample Size 5,387 1,716
Cor. 0.81 0.86
Notes: As for Table 4. No bond guaranteed by a higher rating firm is issued after March 11, 2011.
The model excludes general mortgage bonds after March 11, 2011 due to the lack of within-group
variation.
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Table 7: Effect of Japanese Government Bonds held by the Bank of Japan on Credit Spreads: Firm
Fixed Effects (IV specification)
Full Sample Before March 11, 2011 After March 11, 2011
AAA rating -75.40 -65.52 -20.94 -19.34
(23.23)∗∗∗ (15.60)∗∗∗ (1.80)∗ (1.66)∗
AA rating -55.03 -51.32 -10.99 -11.24
(24.23)∗∗∗ (17.17)∗∗∗ (1.90)∗ (1.94)∗
A rating -32.76 -32.20 -6.93 -6.71
(18.64)∗∗∗ (14.40)∗∗∗ (1.32) (1.28)
log(Amount) -2.44 -3.46 -1.27 1.19
(3.05)∗∗∗ (3.47)∗∗∗ (1.14) (1.07)
Maturity 0.09 0.07 1.03 1.06
(0.77) (0.55) (6.32)∗∗∗ (6.53)∗∗∗
log(debt/GDP) -22.61 -8.17 -174.11
(15.80)∗∗∗ (3.26)∗∗∗ (6.03)∗∗∗
JGB holding ratio -70.18 8.23 -12.58
(7.25)∗∗∗ (2.56)∗∗ (6.15)∗∗∗
General mortgage bond 0.92 1.22
(0.15) (0.19)
Guaranteed (higher rating) -10.54 -16.79
(1.01) (1.48)
Guaranteed (subsidiary) 11.10 22.46 55.21 54.87
(1.76)∗ (2.55)∗∗ (5.51)∗∗∗ (5.48)∗∗∗
log(Size) 10.90 15.91 0.43 1.05
(13.84)∗∗∗ (15.03)∗∗∗ (0.47) (1.18)
∆CPI 5.60 10.26 0.03 -1.15
(9.27)∗∗∗ (11.37)∗∗∗ (0.03) (1.42)
∆IIP -0.36 -0.26 -0.08 -0.10
(6.65)∗∗∗ (3.95)∗∗∗ (0.81) (1.05)
∆CGPI -3.53 -4.66 -1.15 -0.86
(12.17)∗∗∗ (11.87)∗∗∗ (2.76)∗∗∗ (2.25)∗∗
Lehman collapse 11.51 16.69
(3.42)∗∗∗ (4.50)∗∗∗
Nuclear disaster -7.19
(5.34)∗∗∗
Sample Size 7,103 5,387 1,716 1,716
Cor. 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.86
Notes: Sample period: 1996:1-2015:11. As for Table 4. No bond with collateral or guaranteed by
a higher rating firm is issued after March 11, 2011. The model excludes general mortgage bonds
due to the lack of within-group variation after March 11, 2011.
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Table 8: Effect of Japanese Government Bonds held by Bank of Japan on Credit Spreads by Rating
Class: Firm Fixed Effects (IV specification)
Rating Class
AAA&AA ratings A rating BBB rating
Debt to Capital -65.08 -36.96 -19.85
(2.05)∗∗ (1.94)∗ (0.13)
log(Sale) -22.28 -19.38 104.99
(2.40)∗∗ (3.29)∗∗∗ (3.94)∗∗∗
ROE 0.25 -0.26 -2.96
(0.86) (4.03)∗∗∗ (14.55)∗∗∗
log(Amount) -1.35 3.59 -6.49
(0.89) (3.60)∗∗∗ (0.96)
Maturity 0.82 1.79 5.36
(6.46)∗∗∗ (9.98)∗∗∗ (3.88)∗∗∗
JGB holding ratio -12.50 -6.14 -38.85
(3.87)∗∗∗ (3.20)∗∗∗ (3.02)∗∗∗
log(Size) 2.13 0.27 -0.09
(1.82)∗ (0.34) (0.02)
∆CPI 1.18 -0.89 -8.61
(1.10) (1.20) (2.46)∗∗
∆IIP -0.01 -0.11 -0.21
(0.06) (1.12) (0.46)
∆CGPI -1.10 -1.39 2.74
(2.31)∗∗ (3.90)∗∗∗ (1.63)
Sample Size 367 829 178
Cor. 0.92 0.88 0.95
Notes: Sample period: 3/11/2011-11/30/2015. As for Table 4. Bonds with collateral or guaranteed
by a higher rating firm are excluded due to the absence of observations or no variation within a
rating class.
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Table 9: Sample Selection Problem after the Great East Japan Earthquake: Credit Spreads
Selection Regression Selection Regression
Equation (1) Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (2)
Constant 77.24 42.71 77.25 150.56
(3.61)∗∗∗ (2.24)∗∗ (3.00)∗∗∗ (4.05)∗∗∗
Debt to Capital -6.55 -6.55
(0.52) (0.41)
log(Sale) 1.19 1.20
(1.01) (0.82)
ROE 0.36 0.37
(5.93)∗∗∗ (5.15)∗∗∗
AAA rating -64.89 -65.42
(1.65) (1.37)
AA rating -1.88 -54.16 -1.88 -53.87
(0.37) (14.49)∗∗∗ (0.29) (14.44)∗∗∗
A rating -1.81 -39.65 -1.81 -39.70
(0.41) (17.89)∗∗∗ (0.34) (17.99)∗∗∗
log(Amount) -7.98 -0.70 -7.96 -0.53
(5.12)∗∗∗ (0.48) (4.45)∗∗∗ (0.36)
Maturity -0.09 0.62 -0.08 0.57
(0.28) (2.07)∗∗ (0.19) (1.97)∗∗
log(debt/GDP) -114.72
(2.86)∗∗∗
JGB holding ratio 2.61 -12.26 2.61
(0.84) (3.48)∗∗∗ (0.68)
log(Size) 1.15 1.34
(0.77) (0.88)
∆CPI -1.00 -1.70
(0.67) (1.12)
∆IIP -0.17 -0.13
(1.03) (0.82)
∆CGPI -1.17 -1.06
(1.68)∗ (1.39)
σ 21.61 (49.4)∗∗∗ 21.66 (48.14)∗∗∗
ρ 0.14 (9.91)∗∗∗ 0.12 (8.95)∗∗∗
Sample Size 1,381 1,381
Log-likelihood 62.75 63.54
Notes: As for Table 3. The estimated coefficients and t-ratios of industry dummies are not re-
ported.
28
0500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Introduction of QE
Lifting of QE
Introduction
 of QQE
Further 
QQE
   Great East 
Japan Disaster
Figure 1: Balance of Japanese Government Bonds held by the Bank of Japan
Notes: Sample period: 1996:1-2015:12. The figure depicts the Bank of Japans holding of
Japanese government bonds (Hundreds of millions Japanese Yen, solid line). The vertical dashed
lines represent the BOJ’s policy decisions and the Great East Japan Disaster.
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